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I. INTRODUCTION
South Dakota Governor Kristi Noem signed Senate Bill 47 on January
31, 2019.1 The bill, which went into effect on July 1, 2019, permits South
Dakota residents to carry concealed handguns without a concealed carry
permit (also known as a “CCW permit”) or any formal training or educa-
tional requirements.2 “Concealed carry,” or carrying a concealed firearm,
occurs when a citizen carries a firearm under his or her clothes in public.
Concealed carry is legal in all states, but most require their citizens to apply
for a state-issued CCW permit to legally carry concealed firearms. South
Dakota is no longer one of those states.
Unfortunately, this legislation is not an isolated incident. A growing
number of states across the United States are implementing or have imple-
mented statutes allowing firearm owners to carry concealed weapons with-
out any education or training.3 While associations such as the National Rifle
Association (NRA) applaud the deregulation of concealed carry,4 allowing
individuals to carry concealed firearms without training and education is
often considered dangerous.5 It increases the likelihood of a citizen using
his or her firearm at the wrong time and without a full understanding of
what to do during and after a self-defense shooting.6
This note proposes legislation meant to ensure that citizens who wish
to carry concealed weapons understand their legal obligations and have the
1. S.B. 47, 2019 Leg., 94th Sess. (S.D. 2019).
2. Joe Sterling, South Dakota Is the Latest State to Allow Concealed Handguns to Be Car-
ried Without a Permit, CNN (Feb. 1, 2019, 4:42 PM), https://www.cnn.com/2019/02/01/us/sd-
concealed-carry-law-trnd/index.html; for the text of Senate Bill 47; see S.B. 47, 2019 Leg., 94th
Sess. (S.D. 2019); NRA, South Dakota: Constitutional/Permitless Carry Law Goes into Effect
Today, NRA-ILA (July 1, 2019), https://www.nraila.org/articles/20190701/south-dakota-constitu
tional-permitless-carry-law-goes-into-effect-today.
3. Sterling, supra note 2; Map of Concealed Carry Laws in the U.S., HNI (Mar. 24, 2019),
https://www.hni.com/concealed-carry-resources-for-employers/concealed-carry-animated-map.
4. Morgan Gstalter, South Dakota Governor Signs Law to Allow Concealed Handguns
Without a Permit, HILL (Jan. 31, 2019, 4:38 PM), https://thehill.com/homenews/state-watch/
427930-south-dakota-governor-signs-law-allowing-concealed-handguns-without-a; Stephen Gru-
ber-Miller, You Wouldn’t Need a Permit to Carry a Gun in Iowa Under This Proposal, DES
MOINES REG. (Feb. 11, 2019, 6:44 PM), https://www.desmoinesregister.com/story/news/politics/
2019/02/11/guns-iowa-legislature-permitless-carry-owners-proposal-nra-firearms-coalition-per
mits-firearm-permit/2838973002 (quoting Scott Jones, a lobbyist for the NRA, supporting an
Iowan bill for permitless carry).
5. Jack Brammer, ‘Dangerous’ or ‘Common Sense’? NRA Pushes Bill to Allow Concealed
Guns with No Permit, LEXINGTON HERALD LEADER (Feb. 13, 2019, 12:38 PM), https://www.ken
tucky.com/news/politics-government/article226147750.html.
6. Infra Section II, Part B.
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technical training to properly, ethically, and competently defend themselves
and others. Firearm sales have increased over the last two decades,7 with
spikes after most mass shooting events in the United States.8 The increase
of mass shooting events9 coupled with the increase of firearms in the public
underlines the importance of having citizens who carry concealed firearms
be aware of their legal, moral, and technical duties in these dangerous, high-
stress situations. A population that understands how to handle life-threaten-
ing encounters, such as mass shootings or one-on-one confrontations, and
how to best address those situations—whether to run or to engage—is in
the interest of everyone.
Therefore, the United States Congress should pass this note’s proposed
legislation, which restricts federal grants to states’ law enforcement officers
unless those states implement a federally established minimum training and
education requirement for citizens who wish to carry concealed firearms.
Section II of this note underlines the need for training and education for
individuals who wish to carry concealed weapons. Section III proposes the
model legislation, the Citizen’s Firearm Education and Training Safety Act,
and establishes why using federal grant restrictions to incentivize state
adoption of the policy is the best model for implementing the proposal.
Rather than mandating a concealed carry training requirement for every
state, structuring the proposed legislation around the method scrutinized in
South Dakota v. Dole10—utilizing congressional spending power to incen-
tivize state action—is less likely to be successfully challenged. Section IV
explains why the proposed legislation not only survives Second Amend-
ment scrutiny but is actually directly supported by the Second Amend-
ment’s text. Finally, Section V answers the expected arguments against
implementing federal firearms regulations.
7. Jack Beckwith & Michael Hester, A Look at Gun Sales by State: How U.S. Gun Statistics
Have Changed Since 1999, DATAFACE (Mar. 2, 2018), http://thedataface.com/2018/03/economy/
us-gun-sales.
8. Gayathri Anuradha, Why Do Gun Sales in the US Spike After Mass Shootings?, INT’L
BUS. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.ibtimes.com/why-do-gun-sales-us-spike-after-
mass-shootings-2607059.
9. Bonnie Berkowitz et al., The Terrible Numbers That Grow with Each Mass Shooting,
WASH. POST (Dec. 10, 2019), https://www.washingtonpost.com/graphics/2018/national/mass-
shootings-in-america/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.540d5fff9efa. Note, however, that firearm
homicides in the United States have dropped substantially since 1993. Gun Violence in America,
NAT’L INST. OF JUST. (Feb.  26, 2019), https://www.nij.gov/topics/crime/gun-violence/Pages/wel
come.aspx.
10. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
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II. MANY STATES ALLOW UNTRAINED, UNEDUCATED CIVILIANS TO
CARRY A CONCEALED FIREARM, WHICH ENDANGERS CIVILIAN
LIVES AND INCREASES THE RISK OF IMPROPER GUN
USE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE
A. Many States Do Not Require Firearm Education or Training, and
Among Those That Do, There Is No Standardized Format or
Requirement
Currently, each state has discretion over its concealed carry laws, such
as whether the state requires a permit to carry a concealed firearm at all.
States that require a state-issued permit are categorized as either “Shall Is-
sue” or “May Issue.”11 States that do not require a permit are categorized as
“Permitless Carry.”12
This note’s proposed legislation predominantly affects those states that
have permitless carry (also known as “Constitutional Carry” or “Un-
restricted Carry”) policies in place. Permitless carry means that no CCW
permit is required, and thus no formal application, training, or education is
required to carry a concealed handgun in that state.13 Sixteen states have
some form of permitless carry provision in place, either for anyone cur-
rently within the state or for residents of the state only.14 Several states have
become permitless carry states within the past five years, showing an in-
creasing trend of states becoming permitless carry jurisdictions.15 Eight of
these states have populations where gun ownership is above the national
average.16 However, none of these permitless carry jurisdictions require any
education or training to carry a concealed firearm. South Dakota and Ken-
11. Concealed Carry Permit Information by State, USA CARRY, https://www.usacarry.com/
concealed_carry_permit_information.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2019). The difference between
“May Issue” and “Shall Issue” is whether the official issuing the permit has discretion to deny the
citizen a permit or not. “May Issue” states give the permitting authorities more options for not
issuing the permit, based on factors outside of the state’s statutes or official requirements, such as
an applicant’s moral character or showing a “need” to carry a concealed firearm. Concealed
Carry, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., https://lawcenter.giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/guns-in-public/
concealed-carry (last visited Apr. 9, 2019).
12. See USA CARRY, supra note 11. Note that there is a fourth category, “Right Denied,”
which means that no person shall carry a concealed firearm in the jurisdiction. Strictly speaking,
there are no states categorized as “Right Denied,” but it is upheld in the jurisdictions of American
Samoa and the N. Mariana Islands.
13. See Gruber-Miller, supra note 4.
14. HNI, supra note 3; C. Mitchell Shaw, Constitutional Carry Gaining Ground: Kentucky
16th State to Allow Permitless Concealed Carry, NEW AM. (Mar. 13, 2019), https://www
.thenewamerican.com/usnews/constitution/item/31734-constitutional-carry-gaining-ground-ken
tucky-16th-state-to-allow-permitless-concealed-carry.
15. HNI, supra note 3.
16. Thomas C. Frohlich & Samuel Stebbins, 12 States Where Anyone Can Carry a Con-
cealed Weapon, YAHOO! FIN. (July 18, 2017), https://finance.yahoo.com/news/12-states-where-
anyone-carry-191149093.html.
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tucky joined their ranks in 2019.17 Ohio is currently considering implement-
ing permitless carry in 2019.18 These states represent the growing gap
between increasing concealed carry and decreasing legal and technical edu-
cation about firearm ownership and self-defense.
However, permitless carry states are not the only states that lack for-
mal education and training requirements. Several states with CCW permit
requirements do not require either substantive shooting range or classroom
training to obtain the permit.19 Furthermore, while several states do have
minimum requirement statutes for applicants’ legal and technical education
on self-defense and firearm use, these statutes can be vague.20 The length of
the CCW certification program is often not statutorily designated, so long
as the certification course is taught by a “certified instructor.”21 The certifi-
cation courses themselves can vary wildly in length and depth—the length
of a course can range anywhere from ninety minutes to sixteen hours.22 The
courses can even fluctuate within a single state; in Minnesota, one possible
certification course lasts half as long as another.23 Both courses grant certi-
fication, but the question of why one course is twice as long as the other is
17. Gstalter, supra note 4; Matthew Glowicki & Kala Kachmar, Kentucky’s New Concealed
Carry Law: Here’s What You Should Know, COURIER J. (Mar. 17, 2019, 5:43 PM), https://www
.courier-journal.com/story/news/politics/ky-legislature/2019/03/12/what-know-new-kentucky-
concealed-carry-law/3141601002.
18. Kevin Freeman, Ohio Lawmakers Propose Bill to Let Residents Carry Concealed
Weapon Without Permit, FOX 8 CLEVELAND (Mar. 28, 2019, 10:19 PM), https://fox8.com/2019/
03/28/bill-in-ohio-would-allow-residents-to-carry-concealed-weapon-without-a-permit.
19. Jennifer Mascia, 26 States Will Let You Carry a Concealed Gun Without Making Sure
You Know How to Shoot One, TRACE (Apr. 17, 2017, 11:37 AM), https://www.thetrace.org/2016/
02/live-fire-training-not-mandatory-concealed-carry-permits.
20. Minnesota’s concealed carry statute is an example of vague requirements. See MINN.
STAT. § 624.714 (2018). The statute has specific training and education requirements but gives
little indication of what constitutes “an actual shooting qualification exercise” or “fundamental
legal aspects of pistol possession, carry, and use.” Each training course can be significantly differ-
ent in depth given the openness of the statute.
21. Id.
22. For a comparison on how much concealed carry classes can vary, one possible California
CCW certification course runs for two days and has substantial legal education and range time,
whereas the Minnesota CCW certification counterpart can take only four hours. A course that
qualifies a citizen to carry in several states, such as Virginia and Idaho, takes only ninety minutes
and is completely online. The California course: CCW California Concealed Carry Weapon 2 Day
Course, FIREARMS TRAINING ASSOCS., https://www.ftatv.com/ccw-california-concealed-carry-
weapon-2-day-course (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). The Minnesota course: Minnesota Multi-State
Permit to Carry Class, MN FIREARMS TRAINING, https://www.mnfirearms.com/mn-conceal-and-
carry (last visited Mar. 1, 2020). The online course: Concealed Carry Training Online, AM. FIRE-
ARMS TRAINING, https://www.concealedcarryonline.com/courses (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
23. Compare the training course for Minnesota, supra note 22, with a course offered in the
same state, here: MN Permit to Carry Classes, OSSEO GUN CLUB & PRO SHOP, https://www
.osseogunclub.com/mn-permit-to-carry-class.html (last visited Apr. 9, 2019) (for more detail on
the CCW Permit class, click on the “MN Permit to Carry Class Brochure” button). One class is
three hours long; the other is five hours long. Either one class is providing less educational infor-
mation or range practice than the other, or one is conducted in a seriously inefficient manner. In
either case, it is up to the citizen to decide which to attend, meaning different citizens in the same
state and even the same city can receive substantially different concealed carry training.
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unanswered. Whether the longer course teaches more, or has a harder shoot-
ing examination, is unknown. Either way, applicants can choose between
the two since both fit Minnesota’s statutory requirements. Because of the
variations in course length and the vagueness of the concealed carry stat-
utes, what constitutes a satisfactory education or demonstration of range
skills, and how the course is structured, can depend solely on the firearm
instructor.
One of the few CCW programs that has consistent training require-
ments is the federally implemented Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act
(LEOSA), which allows “qualified” active and retired law enforcement of-
ficers to carry a concealed firearm in any state.24 To earn this privilege,
qualified retired officers are required under LEOSA to complete the officer
training course of their resident state or a similar course meant for active-
duty officers within the state.25 This is arguably the closest to a standard-
ized training requirement for individuals wishing to carry concealed weap-
ons. Yet, it can still be affected by differences between state law
enforcement agencies’ shooting exams. Furthermore, its scope is limited
since it is applicable only to active and retired law enforcement officers, not
civilians.26
B. Firearm Training and Education Can Improve General Firearm
Safety, Decrease Improper Defensive Gun Usage, Better
Prepare Defensive Shooters for Engagements, and Reduce
Deadly Interactions with Law Enforcement
While firearm regulation is often a partisan issue, the issues resulting
from insufficient training and education when using a firearm are common
sense. This note underlines several of those common-sense issues. First, the
upswing in states no longer requiring training or education for concealed
carry creates a dangerous rise of gun owners who do not understand basic
firearm safety.27 Furthermore, a lack of training increases the likelihood
that concealed-firearm carriers will improperly use their firearms and face
legal liability.28 It also reduces the likelihood that citizens will fully under-
stand how to handle the aftermath of a defensive shooting.29 Finally, train-
ing decreases the risk of acting improperly and endangering the carrier
when interacting with police officers.30
24. See Law Enforcement Officer Safety Act, 18 U.S.C. § 926B (2004).
25. 18 U.S.C. § 926C(4) (2004).
26. Id.
27. Infra Section B, Part 1.
28. Infra Section B, Part 2.
29. Infra Section B, Part 3.
30. Infra Section B, Part 4.
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1. Proper Firearm Training and Education Can Reduce the Risk of
Accidental Shootings and Injuries
At a bare minimum, individuals carrying or using firearms should be
taught the basic safety requirements of handling, cleaning, and storing their
firearms.31 These rules include the most basic, standard four rules of fire-
arm safety—rules that every firearm owner should be cognizant of any time
he or she is around a gun. They are: (1) always treat every firearm as though
it is loaded, (2) never point the gun at anything you are not willing to de-
stroy, (3) keep your finger outside the trigger guard until ready to shoot, and
(4) always be sure of your target and what is in front of it and behind it.32
While there are other important, more nuanced rules that every firearm user
should follow,33 these four rules, if followed attentively, should ensure that
a firearm user does not accidentally fire his or her weapon (known as a
negligent discharge), which might harm the user or others.34
However, in spite of the ubiquity of these rules, in 2018 alone, more
than 1,600 unintentional shootings that led to injury or death happened in
the United States.35 Not every incident involved concealed carry, but with
proper training and education, many could have been avoided.36 None of
the sixteen permitless carry states requires individuals to be taught these
four foundational rules of firearm safety, greatly increasing their risk in
handling their firearms.37 For at least the portion of those 1,600 incidents
where the firearm was used by someone who carried a concealed firearm,
mandatory training and education could have reduced the number of inju-
ries and deaths per year from accidental shootings by instilling proper han-
dling techniques in the owner. As Kelly Vanden, owner of Criterion
Tactical, a firearms training center in San Antonio, states:
I always use the driving analogy: You get your teenager behind
the wheel, it’s a complete mess. . . . It’s the same thing with a
weapon. You get a person who’s unfamiliar and put a live
31. See The 4 Rules of Firearm Safety, HUNTER ED, https://www.hunter-ed.com/gun-safety
(last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
32. Id.; Cameron Hopkins, Jeff Cooper: Father of Modern Pistol Shooting, NRA AMERICAN
RIFLEMAN (May 18, 2011), https://www.americanrifleman.org/articles/2011/5/18/jeff-cooper-fa
ther-of-modern-pistol-shooting; Bruno Adrovini, The 4 Rules of Gun Safety, GUNSWEEK.COM
(Nov. 2, 2016, 5:50 PM), https://www.gunsweek.com/en/technics/articles/4-rules-gun-safety; The
Four Rules of Firearm Safety, LIBERTY HOME CONCEALMENT, https://libertyhomeconcealment
.com/pages/the-four-rules-of-firearm-safety (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
33. See NRA Gun Safety Rules, NRA EXPLORE, https://gunsafetyrules.nra.org (last visited
Mar. 1, 2020).
34. Staff Writer, The Four Rules of Gun Safety for Beginners (and Everyone Else), THE
TRUTH ABOUT GUNS (Feb. 11, 2019), https://www.thetruthaboutguns.com/the-four-rules-of-gun-
safety-for-beginners-and-everyone-else.
35. Past Summary Ledgers, GUN VIOLENCE ARCHIVE, https://www.gunviolencearchive.org/
past-tolls (last visited Apr. 10, 2019).
36. See How Can Proper Gun Safety Lower the Number of Accidents?, AFTERMATH, https://
www.aftermath.com/content/accidental-shooting-deaths-statistics (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
37. See HNI, supra note 3.
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weapon in their hand and expect them to be both competent and
safe, you’re asking a lot of that person.38
2. Education on Self-Defense Law and Firearm Use Can Reduce
the Number of Illegitimate Defensive Gun Uses
Beyond the technical understanding of how to handle a firearm, educa-
tion and training can help reduce legal liability for defensive shooters by
ensuring that concealed firearms are used at legally permissible times. Fire-
arm laws vary greatly by state, with different regulations on when lethal
force is acceptable to use.39 The subtle distinctions that exist in self-defense
law, such as when engaging an assailant is allowed or when disengagement
is required, are distinctions that should be taught to all individuals carrying
concealed firearms. In 2000, two national studies on gun use for self-de-
fense analyzed when guns were used defensively and whether the use was
legally justified. The researchers in one study found that only 43 percent of
Defensive Gun Uses (DGU) were deemed by judges to be legally justified
uses of firearms.40 The National Crime Victimization Survey conducted by
the US Census Bureau found that between 2007 and 2011, 47,000 DGUs
were reported, but 17 percent of those DGUs were incidents where a gun
was improperly used in response to mere verbal threats.41 Even drawing a
firearm in response to mere verbal threats is often unnecessary and illegal,
much less actually firing the weapon.
Had the populations cited in these surveys been more educated on
what constitutes proper use of a firearm in a defensive confrontation, the
statistics of illegal, unjustified DGUs may have been substantially lower.
While there are classes and books that can teach individuals what general
laws need to be followed when using a firearm defensively,42 this education
38. Mascia, supra note 19.
39. See Eugene Volokh, Citizen Kills Robber Who Has What Turns out to Be an Imitation
Gun—Is the Killing Lawful Self-Defense?, WASH. POST (Nov. 2, 2015), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2015/11/02/citizen-kills-robber-who-has-what-turns-out-to-
be-an-imitation-gun-is-the-killing-lawful-self-defense; contrast Illinois’s laws on deadly force
against robbers with Texas’s. Can You Shoot a Fleeing Thief? Texas, U.S. & TEX. LAWSHIELD
(Apr. 2, 2019), https://www.uslawshield.com/defend-property-texas.
40. Daniel W. Webster et al., Concealed Carry of Firearms: Facts v. Fiction, JOHNS HOP-
KINS BLOOMBERG SCH. PUB. HEALTH (Nov. 16, 2017), https://www.jhsph.edu/research/centers-
and-institutes/johns-hopkins-center-for-gun-policy-and-research/publications/concealed-carry-of-
firearms.pdf.
41. Id. Using a firearm in response to a verbal threat is often considered “excessive force.”
Many states require that a firearm should only be used defensively to protect the actor or anyone
else against death or serious bodily harm, with some allowing use when a violent felony is in
action. North Dakota is an example of a state that allows for defense of self and others and against
violent felonies. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1–05 (1973).
42. One set of examples is Massad Ayoob’s series of classes, such as his Mag-40 class. Mag-
40 is “an intense, four-day, 40-hour immersion course in the ‘rules of engagement’ for armed law-
abiding private citizens. The course emphasizes legal issues, tactical issues, and aftermath man-
agement.” MAG40, MASSAD AYOOB GRP., https://massadayoobgroup.com/mag-40 (last visited
Mar. 1, 2020). Having personally taken Mag-40’s predecessor, Lethal Force Institute, from Mas-
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should be required of all citizens legally carrying concealed firearms. An
increase in the understanding of when a gun can legally be used in a defen-
sive situation will help reduce the legal risk to those carrying firearms by
educating them on when lethal force, or even just drawing their firearms, is
a legally acceptable answer to an altercation.
3. Self-Defense Education Ensures That Citizens Carrying
Concealed Weapons Understand How to Act during a
Defensive Gun Use
Even if a citizen understands the techniques and laws for self-defense
with a firearm, there are still personal and legal issues after a defensive
shooting of which citizens need to be aware. As Massad Ayoob, an author-
ity on self-defense tactics, law, and training, states: “Never forget that when
you shoot someone, however necessarily and justifiably, you look an awful
lot like a killer and he looks an awful lot like a victim. . . . The old saying
‘You only get one chance to make a first impression’ is absolutely true
here.”43 Even if citizens believe they fired their firearms in the correct set-
ting, they still need to be trained on what to do after they fire their weapons.
From a legal perspective, Ayoob recommends following the five-point
checklist he established, which has been adopted by the US Concealed
Carry Association (USCCA) as its official recommendation of what to do
after a “critical incident.”44 The list includes: (1) establish the active dy-
namic—meaning you should inform authorities immediately of what hap-
pened, emphasizing what the attacker was trying to do to you when you
fired your weapon so that police know who the victim is and who the at-
tacker is; (2) advise the police that you will sign a complaint stating you
were attacked; (3) point out the evidence; (4) point out the witnesses; and
(5) politely decline further questioning until you have consulted an attor-
sad Ayoob, I can say that, the legal and technical education was substantially more in-depth than
my own state’s CCW permit class. Massad Ayoob’s book, Deadly Force, also covers the topic of
legal DGU and law. MASSAD AYOOB, DEADLY FORCE: UNDERSTANDING YOUR RIGHT TO SELF
DEFENSE (2014). Additionally, a more comprehensive look at the law of self-defense comes from
Andrew Branca’s book, The Law of Self Defense: The Indispensable Guide for the Armed Citizen.
ANDREW F. BRANCA, THE LAW OF SELF DEFENSE: THE INDISPENSABLE GUIDE FOR THE ARMED
CITIZEN (3rd ed. 2016).
43. AYOOB, supra note 42, at 202. The Armed Citizens’ Legal Defense Network describes
Massad Ayoob as
one of the pre-eminent fighting handgun trainers in the world. His methods of reflexive,
high speed yet accurate shooting has been adopted by the U.S. Army as part of its
standard pistol-training course. Former director of Lethal Force Institute, and owner/
operator of the Massad Ayoob Group, he is directly responsible for training thousands in
justifiable use of deadly force, safe gun use and effective defense techniques.
Emotional and Psychological Aftermath of a Self-Defense Shooting, ARMED CITIZENS’ LEGAL
DEF. NETWORK, https://armedcitizensnetwork.org/en/preview-emotional-and-psychological-after
math-of-a-self-defense-shooting (last visited May 10, 2019).
44. AYOOB, supra note 42, at 202. “Critical incident” is a term now being used for incidents
where a person needs to use his or her firearm in self-defense.
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ney.45 These five steps can improve the legal process and outcome for those
who fire their concealed weapons. However, they may not be required
teachings in many concealed carry courses. In Minnesota, for example, the
statute is silent on education or training about what to do after a critical
incident occurs.46
Likewise, there are actions that need to take place after a shooting
occurs that may not be taught in classrooms. The USCCA has a breakdown
of what to do in the first forty-eight hours after a defensive shooting, what
to expect, and how to handle it.47 These actions include holstering your
weapon by the time police arrive, asking a witness to call for an ambulance,
meeting with an attorney the next day, and planning what to say to ensure
police get a clear picture of what happened.48 Following these steps can
help reduce legal liability for a defensive shooter but can also help reduce
the overall damage in a critical incident. Ensuring an ambulance quickly
arrives to the scene, checking whether the attacker is alive or not, and mak-
ing sure police are called immediately afterward can help save lives.
After the incident, the defensive shooter often still faces psychological
and emotional challenges. Ayoob explains that citizens who use their fire-
arms for self-defense often suffer from “The Mark of Cain” syndrome—a
situation after a shooting where society sees a defender as “someone who
has killed,” affecting how the defender perceives himself or herself.49 The
psychological effects after a shooting can include nightmares, insomnia, de-
pression, substance abuse, sexual dysfunction, social withdrawal, and self-
doubt.50 It is important that citizens who carry concealed firearms under-
stand what they might endure if they use their firearms defensively.
Citizens in permitless carry states or states with minimal training and
education requirements are not necessarily trained on the actions that need
to be taken during a self-defense shooting or on the legal and psychological
consequences that occur afterward. Including these lessons in mandatory
concealed carry training will ensure that those who carry concealed firearms
are more knowledgeable and more prepared for the risks and actions they
might take.
45. Id. at 202–06.
46. § 624.714, supra note 20.
47. Robert H. Carp, 48 Hours: What Really Happens After a Self-Defense Shooting, USCCA,
https://www.usconcealedcarry.com/blog/first-48-hours-self-defense-shooting (last visited May 10,
2019).
48. Id.
49. ARMED CITIZENS’ LEGAL DEF. NETWORK, INC., supra note 43.
50. Id.
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4. Firearm Training and Education Reduces the Risk Civilians
Carrying a Concealed Firearm and Officers Face When
Interacting with Each Other
In the states that have recently moved to or are currently debating
moving to a permitless carry system and eliminating any state-required
training or educational requirements, members of local law enforcement
have voiced their concerns regarding officer and civilian safety.51 Officers
have two concerns related to increased risk during police-citizen interac-
tions: the inability to know who is carrying a firearm and the lack of train-
ing for those carrying concealed firearms.52 Whether police knowing if an
individual has a firearm reduces police-civilian interaction risks or not is
outside the scope of this note.53 However, law enforcement agencies’ con-
cerns about training and education are directly related to this note’s pro-
posed legislation.
Reducing the amount of education and training a citizen carrying a
concealed weapon receives, or eliminating it altogether, increases the risk to
all parties during police-citizen encounters.54 There are specific best prac-
tices an individual who is legally carrying a concealed weapon should fol-
low when interacting with police.55 Examples include never reaching
51. Caitlin Thomas, SPD Captain Says New Permitless Carry Law Is a ‘Step Backward,’
O’COLLY MEDIA GRP. (Feb. 28, 2019), http://www.ocolly.com/news/spd-captain-says-new-
permitless-carry-law-is-a-step/article_62affbb4-3bb2-11e9-944f-472d7dc0969a.html; Kala
Kachmar, You No Longer Need a Permit for Concealed Carry. What That Means for Gun-Loving
Kentucky, COURIER J. (June 25, 2019, 10:44 AM), https://www.courier-journal.com/story/news/
2019/06/25/kentucky-new-concealed-carry-law-what-it-means-for-gun-loving-state/1511455001;
Campbell Robertson & Timothy Williams, As States Expand Gun Rights, the Police Object, N.Y.
TIMES (May 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/05/04/us/as-states-expand-gun-rights-po
lice-join-opposition.html.
52. Thomas, supra note 51.
53. There are several factors in assessing whether permitless carry is a safe, reliable model
for civilian concealed carry. Training and education, which are discussed in this note, are two. Not
requiring citizens who carry concealed firearms to submit to background checks or psychiatric
assessments is another. The concern officers note above is that they cannot look up whether some-
one they are stopping has a CCW permit or not, so they cannot determine if that person is likely
carrying a gun or not.
54. See Sheriff Jim Wilson, Traffic Stops: What CCW Citizens Need to Know, NRA FAMILY
(Mar. 7, 2018), https://www.nrafamily.org/articles/2018/3/7/traffic-stops-what-ccw-citizens-need-
to-know. There are both legal and safety risks to being uneducated on how to handle police stops
while armed; some states carry a duty to inform, while others do not.
55. Rob Pincus, What Can We Learn from the Castile Shooting?, PERS. DEF. NETWORK,
https://www.personaldefensenetwork.com/article/can-learn-castile-shooting (last visited Apr. 9,
2019). Rob Pincus is a professional defensive firearms trainer, writer, and consultant. He has had
substantial law enforcement and military training and continues to write, consult, and teach defen-
sive shooting and defensive tactics. He is considered an authority in the defensive shooting and
carry industry. Rob Pincus, I.C.E. TRAINING, https://www.icetraining.us/robpincus.html (last vis-
ited Apr. 9, 2019). For a brief explanation of what to do when someone is carrying a concealed
firearm and stopped by law enforcement, see Sam Hoober, How to Interact with Police While
Carrying CCW, ALIEN GEAR HOLSTERS (Aug. 29, 2018, 7:00 AM), https://aliengearholsters.com/
blog/how-to-interact-with-police-while-carrying-concealed-ccw.
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toward your firearm without express permission and supervision, under-
standing when to inform officers that you are carrying a firearm (often re-
ferred to as a “duty to inform”), and knowing how to calmly speak with
officers once you have informed them that you are armed.56 These stan-
dards are in place to reduce incidents of officers mistakenly believing that a
concealed-firearm carrier is reaching for his or her gun or making some
other potentially threatening gesture, causing the officer to respond with
lethal force. The recent deaths of Philando Castile in Minnesota and Jason
Washington in Oregon demonstrate the gravity of these concerns.57 In both
situations, a citizen who was legally carrying a concealed firearm made a
gesture toward his firearm without any intent to use it, but the officer he
was interacting with interpreted the move as threatening and shot the citi-
zen.58 While there has been substantial discussion of what other factors led
to these innocent concealed-firearm carriers being shot, such as improper
police training and racial bias,59 adherence to best practices, if not already
followed in those incidents, may have minimized the potential for conflict.
Citizens in states lacking a training requirement presumably do not
learn how to properly interact with officers or how to follow these best
practices, which is an issue of grave concern. Even in states with training
and education requirements, such as Minnesota where Philando Castile was
shot, there is no explicit requirement to teach CCW applicants how to inter-
act with police.60 Ignorance of how to interact with officers while carrying a
concealed weapon can turn an average traffic stop into a deadly incident
56. Hoober, supra note 55.
57. Pincus, supra note 55. The example given in Rob Pincus’s article is the 2016 shooting of
Philando Castile. Pincus notes that there were several factors at play in the shooting of Philando
Castile, many of which pointed towards the officer’s conduct. Another incident of a CCW permit
holder being killed in a police interaction unnecessarily happened near Portland State University.
Jason Washington had a valid CCW, but after police responded to a call about a man near a fight
with a firearm, they arrived to find Washington. When Washington accidentally dropped his gun,
he moved to pick it up, at which point the officers fired upon him and killed him. Jenni Fink, Navy
Veteran Shot by Portland Campus Police After Gun Fell from Holster Had Concealed Carry
Permit, NEWSWEEK (July 3, 2018, 11:25 AM), https://www.newsweek.com/navy-veteran-shot-
portland-campus-police-after-gun-fell-holster-had-concealed-1006068. In both the Philando Cas-
tile incident and the Jason Washington incident, the officers stated they were concerned the CCW
holder was reaching for his firearm, which is why the officers fired their weapons. In both cases,
the officers were not convicted. See Ericka Cruz Guevarra, PSU Police Shot at Jason Washington
17 Times, Report Says, OPB (Sept. 19, 2018, 11:15 AM), https://www.opb.org/news/article/port
land-state-police-jason-washington-autopsy-report; Mitch Smith, Minnesota Officer Acquitted in
Killing of Philando Castile, N.Y. TIMES (June 16, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/16/
us/police-shooting-trial-philando-castile.html.
58. Pincus, supra note 55; see also Fink, supra note 57.
59. Eric J. Cooper, A Police Officer Didn’t Kill Philando Castile. Implicit Bias Did, HUFF
POST (June 30, 2017, 9:54 AM), https://www.huffpost.com/entry/a-police-officer-didnt-kill-phil
ando-castile-implicit_b_595654c0e4b0c85b96c660fc; David Kopel, Bad Police Training May
Have Killed Philando Castile, WASH. POST (June 22, 2017, 3:58 PM), https://www.washington
post.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/06/22/bad-police-training-may-have-killed-philando-
castile.
60. § 624.714, supra note 20.
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simply because the citizen made a move that the officer interpreted as
threatening—a move that could have been avoided had the citizen under-
stood best practices.
Indeed, police officers themselves often advocate for training. In Feb-
ruary 2019, Oklahoma passed H.B. 2597, which implements permitless
carry and removes training and education requirements for citizens carrying
concealed weapons.61 Oklahoma City Police Chief Bill Citty voiced his
concern over the bill’s passage, noting that “good people make mistakes.”62
Citty stated that due to the new law, police will have to update their training
policy in order to more appropriately respond to more people who are
armed during everyday calls.63 Stillwater, Oklahoma Police Department
Captain Kyle Gibbs echoed this concern over H.B. 2597’s elimination of
required training and recommended that individuals who wish to carry con-
cealed firearms should seek out training on their own.64 In Ohio, the Frater-
nal Order of Police opposed the state’s recent proposal for permitless carry,
stating that concealed carry training is key to safety.65
While the proposed legislation in Section III can help reduce the num-
ber of deadly citizen-officer interactions, it would be disingenuous to say
that it can solve the problem entirely. There are other factors that can influ-
ence interactions between officers and civilians, such as racial bias and im-
proper police training. This is one of the reasons the proposed legislation in
Section III requires that officers themselves train permit holders to help
both parties understand how to interact with each other. Therefore, to help
maximize the safety of concealed carry permit holders interacting with law
enforcement officers, a required training and education program that in-
cludes best practices on how to interact with police while carrying a firearm
should be implemented in every state.
III. CONGRESS SHOULD INCENTIVIZE STATES TO ADOPT A FEDERALLY
ESTABLISHED MINIMUM EDUCATION AND TRAINING
REQUIREMENT THROUGH THE SPENDING CLAUSE
Considering the importance of training and education for firearm users
generally and the increased risk of incident for concealed-firearm carriers,
this note proposes the Citizen’s Firearm Education and Training Safety Act
(CFETS Act) (Appendix A). The CFETS Act is based on the conditional
61. H.B. 2597, 57 Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2019).
62. KFOR-TV & K. Querry, Oklahoma City Police Chief Discusses Concerns Regarding
Permitless Carry, NEWS 4 (Mar. 1, 2019, 2:54 PM), https://kfor.com/2019/03/01/oklahoma-city-
police-chief-discusses-concerns-regarding-permitless-carry.
63. Id.
64. Thomas, supra note 51.
65. Jessie Balmert, Kentucky Just Let People Carry Concealed Guns Without a Permit. Ohio
Introduces a Similar Bill, CIN. ENQUIRER (Mar. 28, 2019, 1:50 PM), https://www.cincinnati.com/
story/news/politics/2019/03/28/kentucky-just-eliminated-permits-concealed-carry-ohio-follow/
3299750002.
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grant funding technique reviewed in South Dakota v. Dole.66 This model for
legislative action may seem derivative; Congress will not actually pass leg-
islation requiring the states to implement a minimum training program. In-
stead, Congress will incentivize states to do so by restricting the amount of
funding that noncompliant states receive. However, there are two primary
purposes for passing this style of legislation.
First, it is empirically effective.67 When Congress passed the National
Minimum Drinking Age Act to incentivize states to raise the minimum
drinking age to twenty-one by withholding federally granted highway
funds, the remaining noncompliant states all raised their minimum age to
twenty-one within four years of the act’s passage.68 The second purpose for
using this model of legislation is critical; the conditional grant funding tech-
nique reviewed in Dole allows Congress to achieve policy goals
that, if passed as a federal mandate on states, would be considered
unconstitutional.
A. Federally Mandating a Minimum Training Requirement Will Violate
the Anticommandeering Precedents of the Tenth Amendment
The Tenth Amendment states, “The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to
the States respectively, or to the people.”69 The primary purpose of the
Tenth Amendment is to establish the bounds of federalism, with one pri-
mary concern focusing on acts of Congress that “commandeer” the rights of
state legislatures70 or state officials.71 Congress commandeers state legisla-
tures or state officials when it enacts regulation that either demands that
state officials execute and enforce the federal regulation72 or demands that
state legislatures “regulate pursuant to Congress’ direction.”73 These com-
mandeering acts violate the core of the Tenth Amendment; namely, the lim-
itation of power on the federal government and the reservation of power to
the states.74 Two fundamental “anticommandeering” cases, Printz v. United
66. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
67. Upon passage of the National Minimum Drinking Age law, the states that held out for
lower drinking ages acquiesced to a higher drinking age so they could receive federal highway
grants. See Lisa Belkin, Wyoming Finally Raises Its Drinking Age, N.Y. TIMES (July 1, 1988),
https://www.nytimes.com/1988/07/01/us/wyoming-finally-raises-its-drinking-age.html; see also
State History of MLDA 21, PROCON.ORG (Mar. 3, 2016), https://drinkingage.procon.org/state-his
tory-of-mlda-21.
68. See Belkin, supra note 67; see also State History of MLDA 21, supra note 67.
69. U.S. CONST. amend. X.
70. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S.
898, 905 (1997).
71. Printz, 521 U.S. at 933; see also Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 138 S.
Ct. 1461, 1477 (2018).
72. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 898.
73. New York, 505 U.S. at 174.
74. Id. at 157.
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States and New York v. United States, underline precisely why laws mandat-
ing that states enact a minimum training and education requirement for con-
cealed-firearm carriers would be unconstitutional.
If Congress were to attempt to mandate a federally established mini-
mum training and education requirement, it would have to do so in one of
two ways. The first route would be to pass legislation requiring that all law
enforcement officers in the states administer the proposed training before
issuing a CCW permit. Alternatively, Congress could pass legislation that
requires all citizens receive the minimum training before carrying a firearm
and demands that state law enforcement officers enforce the requirement. In
either situation, Congress is demanding state officials enforce federal regu-
lations, a demand that violates the holding of Printz v. United States.
In Printz, the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act (Brady Act)
required the chief law enforcement officer (CLEO) of each local jurisdic-
tion to conduct background checks of prospective handgun purchasers until
a national system for background checking could be completed.75 In re-
sponse, Jay Printz and Richard Mack, the CLEOs of Ravalli County, Mon-
tana, and Graham County, Arizona, respectively, challenged the provisions
of the Brady Act that required CLEOs to perform background checks, as-
serting that such a mandate was unconstitutional.76 The Court analyzed the
CLEOs’ challenge in “historical understanding and practice, in the Consti-
tution’s structure, and in this Court’s jurisprudence.”77 It then cited New
York v. United States in holding that “[t]he Federal Government may not
compel the States to enact or administer a federal regulatory program.”78
The Court struck down the offending portion of the Brady Act for imposing
mandatory obligations on state officials.
If Congress attempted to require that state CLEOs administer the pro-
posed training program, this would parallel the Brady Act’s mandate that
CLEOs administer background checks and thus violate the holding in
Printz. Alternatively, Congress could mandate that the citizens themselves
must receive acceptable training.79 However, enforcement of this mandate
75. Printz, 521 U.S. at 903; 18 U.S.C.A. § 922(s)(1)(A)(i)(III, IV).
76. Printz, 521 U.S. at 904.
77. Id. at 905.
78. New York, 505 U.S. at 188; Printz, 521 U.S. at 933.
79. This is a debatable premise. Congress can pass mandates on individuals acting in their
personal capacity as citizens. New York, 505 U.S. at 930–31. However, a law forcing a mandate
on an individual requires some form of constitutional power granted to Congress to pass the
mandate. The power that Congress would likely claim to use here would be the Commerce Clause,
or the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce. U.S. CONST. Art. I § 8, cl. 3. A possible
theory for using the Commerce Clause is that state CCW reciprocity creates enough interstate
commerce that it can be regulated by the Federal Government. Concealed carry reciprocity is the
ability to get a CCW Permit in one state and have it honored in another state. CCW Reciprocity
Maps, GUNS TO CARRY, https://www.gunstocarry.com/ccw-reciprocity-map (last visited Apr. 12,
2019). Some individuals specifically seek out CCW Permits from other states (many states allow
nonresidents to apply and acquire their CCW permits) because they want more favorable reciproc-
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could be done at only the federal level; any legislation that requires state
officials to enforce the mandate on individuals would also violate Printz
and thus be unconstitutional.
In either case, without enforcement by state officials, any federal law
imposing training and education requirements would be functionally unen-
forceable. In 2017 alone, there were 17,251,354 CCW permits in the United
States.80 This number does not include the sixteen states that allow
permitless carry since knowing who is carrying a concealed firearm in the
permitless carry states is impossible. Requiring that these CCWs and
permitless carry citizens seek out and receive the training and education on
their own before applying for their state CCW permit (or simply beginning
to carry concealed firearms in a constitutional carry state) would create an
unenforceable requirement. Without state support, effective federal enforce-
ment of an individual mandate on citizens to receive training would be pro-
hibitively expensive and practically impossible.
The second way Congress could attempt to mandate a federally estab-
lished minimum training requirement is by requiring state governments to
enact the legislation themselves. Here, New York gives guidance on why
this method is also unconstitutional. In New York, the Court considered the
constitutionality of the Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act.81 The act
was intended to address the growing problem of radioactive waste manage-
ment in the United States, as sites that could safely store radioactive mate-
rial away from humans were becoming scarce.82 The premise of the act was
to use three incentive programs to encourage or require states to open radio-
active waste containment sites.83 Of the three incentive programs, two were
held constitutional. One used Dole-style grant limitations discussed further
below.84 The other used Congress’s commerce power to allow states the
option of shutting off access from their sites to other states that do not
ity agreements. Currently, the average state recognizes permits from 30 other states, which sup-
ports the idea of a “market” of CCW permits. Brandon Moseley, Mike Rogers Cosponsors
Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act, ALA. POL. REP. (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.alreporter.com/
2019/01/30/mike-rogers-cosponsors-concealed-carry-reciprocity-act. The argument in favor of us-
ing the commerce clause is that concealed carry permit reciprocity creates an interstate commerce
market. Just as the Court held in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005), even if an individual
does not use interstate reciprocity for their concealed carry permit, their purely local activity could
be part of an economic “class of activities,” namely the system of reciprocity and individuals
applying for other states’ CCW permits.
With the justification above, a minimum training and education requirement on individual
citizens may be constitutional under the Commerce Clause of the Constitution, but as this essay
explains, that mandate would still be functionally unenforceable without states’ officers’ assis-
tance, therefore violating anticommandeering law.
80. Concealed Carry Statistics, GUNS TO CARRY, https://www.gunstocarry.com/concealed-
carry-statistics/#numbers (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
81. New York, 505 U.S. at 149; 42 U.S.C. § 2021b (1986).
82. New York, 505 U.S. at 150.
83. Id. at 150–51.
84. Id. at 171–72.
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conform to the federal regulation.85 The third incentive, known as the “take
title” provision, required that states either take title possession of radioac-
tive waste generated in their borders or regulate their waste according to the
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act.86 The “take title” provision was
found to be unconstitutional because it created a lose-lose scenario where
Congress essentially forced state legislatures to enact specific legislation.87
The Court held that mandating that states adopt state regulations or coercing
them into doing so violates the boundaries between state and federal power
and therefore violates the Tenth Amendment.88
Thus, Congress is barred from requiring that states pass their own
training and education requirement statutes and cannot coerce them into
doing so. However, as the Court notes in New York, there is still the consti-
tutionally valid option laid out in Dole. Congress can incentivize states to
enact regulations by using congressional spending power to reasonably
limit grants to states that do not implement Congress’s preferred legislation.
The distinction between incentivize and coerce is discussed below.
B. Congress Should Use Its Spending Power to Incentivize States to
Adopt the Proposal by Withholding Grant Funding from
Noncompliant States
As the New York Court noted, if Congress wants to pass legislation
incentivizing state action, it may do so through the Spending Clause by
attaching conditions on the receipt of federal grants.89 This method of in-
centivizing state action was most clearly enunciated as a constitutional use
of the Spending Clause in South Dakota v. Dole.90
In 1984, Congress passed the National Minimum Drinking Age Act.91
The act limited federal grants for state highway projects to those states that
passed legislation implementing a minimum drinking age of twenty-one.92
States that refused would have 5 percent of their possible federal highway
funds withheld.93 South Dakota, one of the few states that did not have a
minimum drinking age of twenty-one or older, challenged this law, stating
the act “violate[d] the constitutional limitation on congressional exercise of
the spending power.”94 The court noted that the Spending Clause of the
Constitution “empowers Congress to ‘lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Im-
posts, and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence
85. Id. at 173.
86. Id. at 186.
87. Id.
88. See New York, 505 U.S. at 188–89.
89. Id. at 167.
90. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987).
91. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984).
92. Id.
93. Dole, 483 U.S. at 204.
94. Id. at 205.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 19 20-MAY-20 7:26
2020] REQUIRING THE BARE MINIMUM 465
and general Welfare of the United States’”95 and that incidental to that
power is the ability to attach conditions to the receipt of federal funds “to
further broad policy objectives.”96 Therefore, Congress’s withholding of
federal grants for highway funds from states that did not have a minimum
drinking age of twenty-one was constitutional.97
However, in coming to its conclusion, the Court established a multi-
element test that limits Congress’s power to use the Spending Clause to
incentivize state action.98 Each element of the test must be met for the legis-
lation in question to be a proper use of the spending power.99 These ele-
ments are (1) the spending must serve the “general welfare”; (2) the
condition placed on the state to receive funding must be unambiguous; (3)
the condition has to relate to the particular federal program; (4) the act
required to receive the funds cannot be unconstitutional; and (5) the amount
being restricted by Congress cannot be so great that it can be considered
coercive to the state’s acceptance of the condition.100 As explained below,
the CFETS Act meets each element of the Dole test.
1. Establishing Minimum Training and Education Requirements
Serves the “General Welfare”
Conditioning federal grants requires that the condition imposed exists
to serve or promote the “general welfare” of the nation.101 What constitutes
general welfare, however, is up to the discretion of Congress, and the courts
cannot rule that a restriction is not for the general welfare unless it is clearly
wrong, a display of arbitrary power, or not an exercise of judgment.102 It is
difficult to find even one case where the general welfare requirement was
not met in a statute utilizing conditional grants. In fact, the Supreme Court
itself has stated that, because of the amount of deference given to Congress,
there is “question[ ] whether ‘general welfare’ is a judicially enforceable
restriction at all.”103 In either case, the Court in Dole indicated that increas-
ing the safety of citizens and preventing lost lives constitutes general
welfare.104
The CFETS Act directly serves the general welfare. As Section II es-
tablished, an increase in concealed carry training and education can help
reduce deadly police interactions and accidental shootings. Requiring edu-
95. Id. at 206 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1).
96. Id. at 206.
97. Id. at 212.
98. Id. at 207–08, 211; New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 178 (1992).
99. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207.
100. Id. at 207–08, 211.
101. Id. at 207 (citing U.S. v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 67 (1936)).
102. Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 672, 641 (1937).
103. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207 n.2.
104. Id. at 208. The Court noted that having young people drinking and driving on the roads
created a dangerous situation and that mitigating that situation served the “general welfare.”
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cation and training to reduce the number of potentially dangerous firearm
situations and save lives parallels the logic of raising the drinking age to
reduce the number of dangerous drinking and driving incidents. Both in-
crease safety to citizens and prevent lost lives.105 With those benefits from
training and education alone, the CFETS Act passes the general welfare
test. Furthermore, given Congress’s wide discretion and the courts’ unwill-
ingness to challenge congressional determinations of general welfare, it will
be difficult to say that the CFETS Act’s benefits of reducing improper de-
fensive gun uses and of preparing concealed-firearm carriers for the legal
and nonlegal ramifications do not qualify as serving the general welfare.
Therefore, the proposal passes the first element of the Dole test.
2. The CFETS Act Is Unambiguous in the Condition It Sets on
States to Receive the Conditional Grants
The second element of the test enunciated in Dole is that the condition
set on the grant funding must be unambiguous.106 This does not mean that
the CFETS Act needs to be meticulously drafted in complete detail at this
point, but that when the legislation is passed, the condition the state must
follow to receive the grant funding is set out unambiguously. As the Court
in Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman noted, “in those in-
stances where Congress has intended the States to fund certain entitlements
as a condition of receiving federal funds, it has proved capable of saying so
explicitly.”107 In the current proposal, the CFETS Act mandates that states
must require their citizens who wish to carry concealed firearms complete
the federally established training and education program, otherwise those
states will not receive a percentage of federal grants for law enforcement.
The CFETS Act’s language for the condition is modeled after the National
Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984 and is explicit.108 Either states enact
the education and training program, or they do not receive the funding.
There is no substantive ambiguity to the condition, so the proposal above is
explicit enough to pass the second element of the Dole test.
3. The CFETS Act Relates to the Expenditure of Funds Because
State and Local Law Enforcement Are Affected by
Concealed-Firearm Carriers
The third element of the Dole test is that the “conditions on federal
grants might be illegitimate if they are unrelated ‘to the federal interest in
105. For the benefits of the Minimum Legal Drinking Age Act, see Fact Sheets - Age 21
Minimum Legal Drinking Age, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/alcohol/fact-sheets/minimum-legal-
drinking-age.htm (last updated Jan. 7, 2020). See also infra Section II, Part B.
106. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208.
107. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 17–18 (1981).
108. National Minimum Drinking Age Act, 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984).
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particular national projects or programs.’”109 This means that when a condi-
tion is placed on a grant, the condition must be related to the goal of the
proposed legislation.110 In Dole, the National Minimum Drinking Age Act
of 1984 restricted federal grants for highway funding unless the states
raised their minimum drinking age to twenty-one.111 The justification was
that teenagers in states with a higher drinking age would use the highways
to drive to states with a lower drinking age, become intoxicated, and then
drive back home, creating a dangerous environment on the highway.112 The
Dole Court held that the restriction on federal highway funds was reasona-
bly related to the goal of the National Minimum Drinking Age Act of
1984—maintaining safety on the highway.113 The CFETS Act parallels the
relationship discussed in the Dole case by proposing legislation that leads to
a safer, more informed, and more legally cognizant population and by re-
stricting funds dedicated to the same objectives.
While the federal government has more than one set of grants it
awards to state and local police departments, the best candidate for grant
restrictions is the set offered by the Office of Justice Programs (OJP). Cur-
rently the OJP has several grants that are available for local and state police
agencies.114 These grants range in topics from training officers on body
camera usage to helping agencies promote public safety,115 but the core
objective of all the grants is to promote the vision of the OJP—“Safe, Just
and Engaged Communities.”116 Likewise, the proposed legislation pro-
motes the same objectives. As discussed in Section II, firearms training and
education can increase public safety through proper handling of firearms. It
can also increase citizens’ safety by teaching citizens carrying concealed
weapons how to appropriately interact with police officers.117 The CFETS
Act also improves safety by educating concealed firearm users on how to
respond after using their firearms, mitigating the damage of violent inci-
dents, and reducing the likelihood of someone being unnecessarily hurt.118
Likewise, education and training creates a more legally cognizant society
by teaching citizens when it is appropriate to use their firearms defensively,
thereby reducing illegitimate DGUs and legal liability.119 Thus, the pro-
posed legislation should, at the very least, restrict the awarding of a percent-
109. Dole, 483 U.S. at 207–08.
110. Id.; Massachusetts v. United States, 435 U.S. 444, 461 (1978).
111. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (1984).
112. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09.
113. Id.
114. Current Funding Opportunities, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, https://ojp.gov/funding/Ex
plore/CurrentFundingOpportunities.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2020).
115. Id.
116. Office of Justice Programs, OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, https://ojp.gov/index.htm (last vis-
ited Mar. 1, 2020).
117. Supra Section II.
118. Id.
119. Id.
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age of OJP funds to states until they implement the federally established
minimum training and education requirements for carrying a concealed
weapon.
In Dole, Justice Brennan voiced his dissent regarding generalized rela-
tionships between the grant and the program in which Congress was inter-
ested.120 He stated that a uniform drinking age of twenty-one is not
sufficiently related to safe interstate travel because it is both under- and
over-inclusive.121 Brennan considered it over-inclusive because it stopped
teenagers from drinking even if they were not going to drive on the high-
way and under-inclusive because teenagers only made up a small portion of
drunk drivers.122 However, the majority still found that the central link,
safety on highways, was enough to link the condition on the grant and the
program Congress was promoting, i.e., a national minimum drinking age.123
The CFETS Act has a stronger tie between the grant condition and the pro-
moted program than the legislation discussed in Dole.
In every shooting scenario, law enforcement is involved. When a con-
cealed-firearm carrier has an accidental discharge and shoots himself or
someone else around him, officers have to investigate. Likewise, when a
concealed-firearm carrier uses her gun defensively, officers have to secure
the scene, write reports, and ensure that all interested parties are handled
properly. In incidents like those involving Philando Castile and Jason
Washington, law enforcement is an interested party.124 In jurisdictions that
issue CCW permits under a “May Issue” paradigm, the permits are granted
by the CLEO of the area, often a sheriff or police chief, at the discretion of
the officer. Therefore, law enforcement is directly involved with the process
of a citizen carrying a concealed weapon.125 The CFETS Act also requires
that law enforcement officers themselves teach the established education
and training program to applicants for concealed carry, intertwining law
enforcement’s involvement with concealed carry even more.
This means that the CFETS Act avoids much of Justice Brennan’s crit-
icisms. Law enforcement officers are often impacted by citizens legally car-
rying concealed weapons and are usually a part of the concealed carry
process. Whereas the Dole Court related funds used to maintain highways
with intoxicated, underage teenagers driving on those highways simply be-
cause the funds promoted safety on the highway,126 the proposed legisla-
tion’s relationship between law enforcement grants and being a well-
120. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 214–25 (1987).
121. Id. at 214.
122. Id. at 214–15.
123. Id. at 208–09.
124. Pincus, supra note 55; Fink, supra note 57.
125. Nicholas Duva, Gun Laws Vary State by State: CNBC Explains, CNBC (Nov. 20, 2014,
8:47 AM), https://www.cnbc.com/2014/11/20/gun-laws-vary-state-by-state-cnbc-explains.html.
126. Dole, 483 U.S. at 208–09.
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informed concealed-firearm carrier is much stronger. The proposed legisla-
tion passes the third element of the Dole test.
4. The Proposal Is Not Coercive Because It Does Not Limit
Funding Unreasonably
Congress may not use its spending power to coerce states into partici-
pating in a particular federal program.127 In Dole, the proposed limitation
on federal grants for highways was 5 percent of available funds.128 The
Court ruled that this was far from coercive given the ability to find funds
another way and the small percentage of the restriction.129 Therefore, the
question of what is coercive is one of judgment and impact. In the proposed
legislation, the restricted funding is minimal enough that states have a “le-
gitimate choice”130 as to whether they will introduce the proposed legisla-
tion or not.
Using the OJP grants for grant restriction, the CFETS Act is structured
to be far from coercive. In 2019, the OJP requested a budget of $1.455
billion in discretionary funding and $2.421 billion in mandatory funding for
a total of $3.876 billion.131 Both the discretionary and mandatory funds
distribute money to state and local police forces to fund local OJP pro-
grams.132 While this number seems large, several police budgets for single
cities can range from $40 million up to $5 billion.133 Likewise, restricting
funds for programs that the OJP supports will not cripple the primary opera-
tions for police departments. That said, the impact of losing those funds will
still be felt by police departments in developing their annual operating
budgets.134 Because of this, the question of exactly what percentage of OJP
funds should be restricted is difficult to answer.
A possible safe-harbor option is to follow the example set in Dole and
only restrict 5 percent of the available federal grants to noncompliant
states.135 However, given that the funds restricted in Dole were less than
127. Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585–87 (1937).
128. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211. Today, however, the restriction on funding is 10 percent of availa-
ble funds to states. 23 U.S.C. § 158 (2012).
129. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211.
130. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 185 (1992).
131. OFF. OF JUST. PROGRAMS, 2019 Budget Summary 1, https://www.justice.gov/jmd/page/
file/1033166/download (last visited Apr. 12, 2019).
132. Id.
133. CITY OF SIOUX FALLS, 2019 CITY OF SIOUX FALLS BUDGET 1, https://www.siouxfalls.org/
finance/budget (last visited Mar. 1, 2020) (click on “2019 City of Sioux Falls Budget” link to
download the report); THE COUNCIL OF THE CITY OF NEW YORK, REPORT OF THE FINANCE DIVI-
SION ON THE FISCAL 2019 PRELIMINARY BUDGET AND THE FISCAL 2018 PRELIMINARY MAYOR’S
MANAGEMENT REPORT FOR THE NEW YORK POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (Mar. 12, 2018) (available at
https://council.nyc.gov/budget/wp-content/uploads/sites/54/2018/03/FY19-New-York-Police-De
partment.pdf).
134. CITY OF SIOUX FALLS, supra note 133, at 2; COPS, COPS, https://cops.usdoj.gov/ (last
visited Mar. 1, 2020).
135. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 211 (1987).
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$800 million,136 compared to the OJP’s $3.876 billion, it may be prudent to
limit the restriction of OJP grants to less than a 5 percent restriction. To try
to comply with both safe-harbor options, the CFETS Act restricts up to 1.5
percent of OJP funds. This creates a grant limitation similar in size to the
National Minimum Drinking Age Act of 1984. However, without a bright-
line rule of what is and is not coercive, the primary guidance for setting a
percent limit should be whether “the enactment of [the CFETS Act] remains
the prerogative of the States not merely in theory but in fact.”137 This is an
attainable standard to reach and, with proper congressional debate about the
CFETS Act’s restrictions, should not be a preventing factor on using condi-
tional grant funding to push a federally-established minimum training and
education requirement.
5. The Proposed Training and Education Requirements Are Not
Themselves Unconstitutional Because They Are Allowable
under the Second Amendment
The final requirement to using conditional grant funding to incentivize
states to enact legislation is that the legislation promoted cannot in itself be
unconstitutional.138 The core of the CFETS Act is for states to enact
mandatory federally established minimum training and education require-
ments for their citizens who wish to carry concealed firearms. This core
legislation places a restriction on when and how citizens could carry fire-
arms, and thus implicates the Second Amendment of the US Constitution.
The analysis of why placing training and education requirements on con-
cealed carry is not unconstitutional under the Second Amendment is signifi-
cant and will be discussed in the next section.
IV. THE CFETS ACT IS SUPPORTED BY THE TEXT
OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT
The proposed legislation must be constitutionally permissible in itself
to use conditional grant funding.139 Because the CFETS Act places limita-
tions on firearm use, the primary concern for constitutionality is whether it
violates Second Amendment protections. The Second Amendment states, “a
well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the
right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”140 His-
torically, there has been debate about whether the Second Amendment ap-
plies to personal ownership of a firearm by citizens or to the idea of having
136. Act to Amend the Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 97–134,
95 Stat. 1699.
137. Dole, 483 U.S. at 211–12.
138. Id. at 208.
139. Id.
140. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
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an actual organized militia.141 However, the US Supreme Court in District
of Columbia v. Heller held definitively that the Second Amendment guaran-
tees individuals the “right to possess and carry weapons in case of confron-
tation.”142 This “individual right” was then held to be incorporated into the
states via the Fourteenth Amendment, which means states and the federal
government have the same minimal level of protections for individuals who
wish to own a firearm.143
However, this individual right under the Second Amendment is not
unlimited; both Heller and McDonald v. City of Chicago stated that Heller
did not “cast doubt on such longstanding regulatory measures as prohibi-
tions on the possession of firearms by felons and the mentally ill, laws for-
bidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places such as schools and
government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and qualifications on
the commercial sale of arms.”144 The Supreme Court noted that these “long-
standing prohibitions” were presumptively lawful, and thus do not violate
the Second Amendment protections.145 However, the Supreme Court did
not establish a standard of review or delineation of what constitutes a “long-
standing prohibition” or what would violate the Second Amendment.146
Given that the list the Supreme Court gave on “longstanding prohibitions”
is not exhaustive,147 the lower courts have had to develop their own two-
part test to determine what legislation violates the Second Amendment.148
The CFETS Act passes this two-part constitutionality test. Moreover, based
on the historical foundation of the Second Amendment and the Supreme
Court’s interpretation in Heller, the CFETS Act has unique textual support
from the Second Amendment, increasing its constitutionality.149
141. D.C. v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 592–95 (2008).
142. Id. at 592.
143. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 786 (2010).
144. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27; McDonald, 561 U.S. at 786 (citing Heller, 544 U.S. at
626–27).
145. Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d 1244, 1253 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
146. The Court cites in the majority opinion that the contested legislation, D.C.’s general
prohibition on possession of a handgun, fails all three standards of review—rational basis, inter-
mediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29. However, the Court does explic-
itly reject the idea of using the “rational basis” standard of review in the opinion’s footnotes. Id. at
628–29 n.27.
147. Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26.
148. IVAN E. BODENSTEINER & ROSALIE BERGER LEVINSON, CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION &
LITIGATION § 1:10.50. CONSTITUTIONAL VIOLATIONS—SECOND AMENDMENT RIGHT TO BEAR
ARMS (2019).
149. See infra Section IV, Part B.
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A. The CFETS Act Passes Each Part of the Two-Part Second
Amendment Constitutionality Test
The lower courts use a two-step test to determine whether an act im-
properly encroaches on Second Amendment protections.150 If the statute
imposes a restriction that can be considered a “longstanding prohibition,”
meaning a type of restriction that existed when either the Second Amend-
ment or the Fourteenth Amendment was passed, then the statute will be
considered “presumptively lawful.”151 These “presumptively lawful” re-
strictions are presumed to be outside of the core protections of the Second
Amendment and thus constitutional.152
If, however, the statute in question does not have the historical pedi-
gree to be considered a “longstanding prohibition,” the lower courts have
applied a means-end scrutiny to determine whether the legislation violates
the Second Amendment.153 Generally, the applied level of scrutiny test has
been intermediate scrutiny.154 Intermediate scrutiny requires that the gov-
ernment “show, first, that it ‘promotes a substantial governmental interest
that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation,’ and second,
that ‘the means chosen are not substantially broader than necessary to
achieve that interest.’”155 The CFETS Act passes both steps of the two-step
test independently.
1. The CFETS Act Affects “Longstanding Prohibitions” and Does
Not Restrict the Core Protections of the Second
Amendment
The first step in the two-step analysis of a Second Amendment claim is
“whether the challenged law imposes a burden on conduct falling within the
scope of the Second Amendment’s guarantee.”156 The Supreme Court in
Heller noted that it did not intend to place doubt on “longstanding prohibi-
tions” with its decision that individuals have the right to personal fire-
arms.157 Based on this assertion, the court in United States v. Marzzarella
adopted the interpretation that “presumptively lawful” restrictions fall
150. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 680 (4th Cir. 2010) (citing United States v.
Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)); see also Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am., Inc. v. Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, & Explosives, 700 F.3d 185, 194 (5th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518 (6th Cir. 2012); Heller, 670 F.3d at 1252; Ezell v. City of Chicago,
651 F.3d 684, 703–04 (7th Cir. 2011); United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800–01 (10th Cir.
2010).
151. Chester, 628 F.3d at 680.
152. Heller v. D.C., 801 F.3d 264, 273 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citing Heller, 670 F.3d at 1254–55).
153. Bodensteiner & Levinson, supra note 148.
154. Id.
155. Heller, 801 F.3d at 295–97 (citing Heller, 670 F.3d at 1254–55 (quoting Ward v. Rock
Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 782–83 (1989))).
156. United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
157. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626–27 (2008).
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outside the scope of the Second Amendment and are an exception to the
right to bear arms.158 While the Court in Heller lists several “presumptively
lawful” restrictions,159 any restriction outside of the list must undergo his-
torical analysis. Because the Court in Heller stated that the Second Amend-
ment simply codified a preexisting right to bear arms, it also codified the
preratification understanding of the right to bear arms as well.160 This
means that the historical analysis must determine whether the restriction
being imposed by the challenged statute is one that existed and was accept-
able at the time when either the Second Amendment or Fourteenth Amend-
ment was adopted. If so, then it is understood to exist outside the core
protections of the Second Amendment and does not violate the Second
Amendment’s protections.161
Under this paradigm, many lower courts have stated that carrying a
concealed firearm is not protected by the Second Amendment.162 The right
to carry a concealed weapon is one that has historically been restricted, both
prior to the establishment of the United States and the Second and Four-
teenth Amendments and after their codification. Dating back to 1299, there
have been restrictions in England on carrying weapons without license in
certain locations or at certain times of day.163 These English laws continued
to evolve, with King James I issuing bans on concealed weapons in 1613
and the Statute of Northampton of 1694 granting legal power to arrest those
carrying concealed armor or weapons on their person.164 These laws shaped
the English Bill of Rights’ possible disallowance for concealed weapons,
which in turn provided the foundation for America’s Bill of Rights and the
Second Amendment.165 As the Peruta court stated, “Thus, by the end of the
eighteenth century, when our Second Amendment was adopted, English law
had for centuries consistently prohibited carrying concealed (and occasion-
ally the even broader category of concealable) arms in public.”166 Likewise,
America’s own localized laws had restrictions on concealed weapons prior
to the adoption of the Second Amendment,167 again establishing that con-
cealed carry restrictions were understood to be allowable under the Second
158. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.
159. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27.
160. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d at 91.
161. United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 518–19 (6th Cir. 2012).
162. Peruta v. Cty. of San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2016); Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d
1197 (10th Cir. 2013); Hightower v. City of Boston, 693 F.3d 61 (1st Cir. 2012). Also, the court in
Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2013), states that concealed carry applications that
require demonstrating a “justifiable need” fall within presumptively lawful regulations. The court
does not expound on its analysis of why restrictions on concealed carry application and permit
granting are presumptively lawful, but the statements show that the 3rd District is a jurisdiction
where restrictions on concealed carry and concealed carry permits are likely constitutional.
163. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 930–31.
164. Id. at 931–32.
165. Id. at 932.
166. Id.
167. Id. at 933.
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Amendment. In the time between adoption of the Second Amendment and
the Fourteenth Amendment, state courts almost unanimously ruled that con-
cealed carry was outside the protection of the Second Amendment.168
Based on the extensive and consistent history of permitted restrictions and
bans on carrying concealed weapons, both leading up to and at the time of
adoption of the Second and Fourteenth Amendments, the Peruta court
echoed the holding of its sister courts in the second, third, fourth, and tenth
districts: “We therefore conclude that the Second Amendment right to keep
and bear arms does not include, in any degree, the right of a member of the
general public to carry concealed firearms in public.”169 All of this supports
the language used in Heller as well:
Like most rights, the right secured by the Second Amendment is
not unlimited. From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases,
commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was
not a right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any man-
ner whatsoever and for whatever purpose. See, e.g., Sheldon, in 5
Blume 346; Rawle 123; Pomeroy 152–153; Abbott 333. For ex-
ample, the majority of the 19th-century courts to consider the
question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons
were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.170
Between the historical analysis done by the district courts, and the spe-
cific language used by the Supreme Court in Heller, the evidence points
toward restrictions on carrying a concealed firearm being presumptively
lawful and thus outside of the scope of the core of the Second Amendment.
Furthermore, these holdings that allow restrictions on concealed carry
all stem from more restrictive statutes than the CFETS Act.171 Unlike a
statute that requires an applicant to show “good cause” to be allowed to
carry a concealed weapon, applicants under the CFETS Act are required to
In 1686, the New Jersey legislature, concerned about the “great abuses” suffered by
“several people in the Province” from persons carrying weapons in public, passed a
statute providing that “no person or persons . . . shall presume privately to wear any
pocket pistol, skeins, stilladers, daggers or dirks, or other unusual or unlawful weapons
within this Province.”
Id. (citing An Act Against Wearing Swords, Etc., 1689 N.J. Laws 289, ch. 9).
168. Id. at 939.
169. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 939. The sister court cases cited in Peruta as supporting the court’s
holding are: Peterson v. Martinez, 707 F.3d 1197 (10th Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712
F.3d 865 (4th Cir. 2013); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426, 429–30 (3d Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty.
of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012).
170. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (emphasis added).
171. The court in Peruta held that California law can require an applicant for concealed carry
to show “good cause” and, in fact, found that there is no Second Amendment right in carrying a
concealed firearm. Peruta, 824 F.3d at 924, 942. The court in Kachalsky held that requiring
“proper cause” to carry a firearm did not violate intermediate scrutiny. Kachalsky, 701 F.3d. at
100–01. “Proper Cause,” or “Justifiable Need,” requires that permit applicants demonstrate they
have a good reason to carry a concealed firearm, and if in the eyes of the granting authority they
do not, then they do not receive their permit to carry a concealed weapon. See generally Kachal-
sky, 701 F.3d at 81.
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take only the minimum training necessary to ensure they are properly pre-
pared for defensive gun use. The DC Circuit Court considered the size of
the Second Amendment burden when it developed its de minimis test for
Second Amendment challenges: if the challenged statute creates a burden
that is de minimis, meaning it has minimal burden on the citizen’s rights,
then it does not implicate the Second Amendment right.172 The district
courts have ruled that concealed carry restrictions are fully constitutional,
even when deciding on far more restrictive statutes; considering how little
the overall burden is from the CFETS Act—adding only a small training
and education requirement for citizens carrying concealed firearms—it is
likely de minimis and thus constitutional.
Therefore, while the CFETS Act places a restriction on citizens hoping
to carry concealed firearms, the act will likely not be considered unconstitu-
tional. The history of concealed carry cases in the district courts supports
this conclusion. Furthermore, the very language of the Supreme Court in
Heller also supports this conclusion. Finally, the restriction being placed
would likely be considered de minimis, at least in the DC Circuit Court.
Thus, the CFETS Act is likely constitutional and passes the constitutionality
requirement of the Dole test.
2. The CFETS Act Passes Intermediate Scrutiny and Is
Constitutional under the Second Amendment
Even if the CFETS Act does not pass the first step of the two-step
Second Amendment test, the second step is to apply a means-end scrutiny
to assess whether the statute is constitutional.173 Generally, the scrutiny test
applied is intermediate scrutiny, though there are some jurisdictions that
apply a “substantial relationship” test, and others that simply look at the
burden the statute puts on the core right of self-defense.174 Regardless of
the test or scrutiny applied, the CFETS Act passes the second step of the
two-step test created in Heller.
The CFETS Act passes the most commonly used test for Second
Amendment constitutionality: intermediate scrutiny. The Heller court spe-
cifically rejected rational-basis scrutiny but refused to specify which level
of scrutiny or what test should be used instead.175 However, many of the
lower courts took the language used in the Heller opinion and determined
that, unless the challenged statute significantly burdens a citizen’s right to
defend herself, the proper scrutiny to be applied is intermediate scrutiny.176
Because the CFETS Act is an optional regulation that states can either opt
172. Heller v. D.C., 801 F.3d 264, 274 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
173. Bodensteiner & Levinson, supra note 148.
174. Id.
175. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628–29 n.27.
176. Wilson v. Lynch, 835 F.3d 1083, 1093 (9th Cir. 2016); see also Heller v. D.C., 670 F.3d
1244, 1257 (D.C. Cir. 2011).
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in to or out of, it can have little to no burden on some citizens. Likewise, the
CFETS Act does not reduce the number of citizens who could carry a con-
cealed weapon but simply asks that they complete a comprehensive training
course before carrying a concealed firearm.177 Furthermore, the act does not
impact the open carrying of firearms or firearm ownership in the home.178
Therefore, the CFETS Act imposes only a modest burden on citizens look-
ing to carry concealed firearms, so it would likely be reviewed under inter-
mediate scrutiny.
“To pass muster under intermediate scrutiny the district must show
[the requirements of the statute] are ‘substantially related to an important
governmental objective.’”179 The statute must provide a tight fit between
the restriction imposed and an important or substantial government interest.
A tight fit is one “that employs not necessarily the least restrictive means
but . . . a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective.”180 So
long as the statute furthers a substantial governmental interest more effec-
tively than if the statute did not exist, and the statute is not unnecessarily
broad, the statute will pass constitutional muster.181
The first step to passing intermediate scrutiny is to show that “the gov-
ernment’s stated objective . . . be significant, substantial, or important.”182
In this case, the objective of the CFETS Act, as stated in Section III, is to
promote public safety by implementing the objectives of the OJP—creation
of safe, just, and engaged communities. The act accomplishes this by reduc-
ing the risk of gun-related injury and death, promoting safe firearm prac-
tices, and educating individuals on their legal obligations while carrying
concealed firearms. These objectives also align with current precedent.
While the Supreme Court has not ruled on a case regarding public safety,
firearms, and intermediate scrutiny, several of the circuit courts have.183
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals solidified a substantial government in-
terest in public safety regarding firearms in Bauer v. Becerra, stating, “‘[i]t
is self-evident’ that public safety is an important government interest, and
177. See infra Appendix A, Citizen’s Firearm Education and Training Safety Act, Section
E(1) (2019).
178. Open Carry is the term used for a person carrying a firearm that is visible to the public.
Some states have different requirements for open carry versus concealed carry, and the two are
usually considered legally separate actions. Sara Ahrens, Concealed Carry vs. Open Carry,
RANGE365 (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.range365.com/concealed-carry-vs-open-carry.
179. Heller, 670 F.3d at 1258 (citing Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 461 (1988)).
180. Bd. of Tr. of State Univ. of N.Y. v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989).
181. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989).
182. United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1139 (9th Cir. 2013).
183. Bauer v. Becerra, 858 F.3d 1216, 1224 (9th Cir. 2017); Kwong v. Bloomberg, 723 F.3d
160, 168–69 (2d Cir. 2013); Nat’l Rifle Ass’n of Am. v. McCraw, 719 F.3d 338, 349 (5th Cir.
2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865, 872–73 (4th Cir. 2013); Heller v. D.C., 801 F.3d
264, 298 (D.C. Cir. 2015).
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reducing ‘gun-related injury and death’ promotes public safety.’”184 Be-
cause the CFETS Act promotes public safety, legal education, and saving
lives, it will likely pass the “substantial governmental interest” portion of
intermediate scrutiny.
The second step to passing intermediate scrutiny is to show that there
is “a reasonable fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted ob-
jective.”185 It does not require “the least restrictive means of furthering a
given end,”186 or that “there is no burden whatsoever on the individual right
in question.”187 It requires only reasonably narrow tailoring. The CFETS
Act achieves this reasonable fit; it increases public safety and decreases
avoidable death but does not overburden society or the individual.
The CFETS Act is far from overbroad. The act affects only a small
portion of gun owners but is effective in promoting its stated objectives.
Civilian-police interactions, accidental shootings, illegitimate DGUs, and
improper pre- and post-DGU responses are all issues that the CFETS Act
mitigates and solves. It is difficult to argue that increasing education about
firearm tactics, self-defense law, and appropriate emergency responses for
citizens carrying concealed weapons would not promote public safety and
reduce the harms discussed in Section II. Likewise, the act affects only the
population most likely to be impacted by the harms discussed in Section II.
Citizens who keep firearms only in the home are outside the scope of the
proposed legislation, as are those who hunt, target shoot, or participate in
target-shooting sports. It could even be argued that the CFETS Act should
be broader and require training for citizens who open carry. Regardless, the
proposed legislation is far from overbroad and impacts only the citizens
necessary to further its goal for public safety. Thus, there is “a reasonable
fit between the challenged regulation and the asserted objective.”188 Be-
cause most Second Amendment claims are reviewed under intermediate
scrutiny, and because the CFETS Act passes both parts of the intermediate
scrutiny test, the law will be considered constitutional. Therefore, it passes
the constitutionality requirement of the Dole test.
B. The CFETS Act Promotes the Textual Meaning of the Second
Amendment
While the CFETS Act passes both steps in the two-step test for Second
Amendment constitutionality, it also holds a unique position that bolsters its
constitutionality. When the Supreme Court in Heller deconstructed the text
of the Second Amendment in its opinion, it noted that the phrase “well-
184. Bauer, 858 F.3d at 1223, (quoting Jackson v. City and Cty. of S.F., 746 F.3d 953, 965
(9th Cir. 2014) (quotations omitted)).
185. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139.
186. Bauer, 858 F.3d at 1223.
187. Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 133 (4th Cir. 2017).
188. Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1139.
\\jciprod01\productn\U\UST\16-3\UST307.txt unknown Seq: 32 20-MAY-20 7:26
478 UNIVERSITY OF ST. THOMAS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 16:3
regulated” as used in the Second Amendment implies the “imposition of
proper discipline and training.”189 The Court in Heller gives the phrase
“well-regulated” little more thought than that, but the statement has a sig-
nificant effect on the proposed legislation. By having the phrase “well-regu-
lated” mean “disciplined and trained,” the actual text and meaning of the
Second Amendment imposes a training requirement on citizens, the very
action the CFETS Act proposes.
This imposition is historically supported as well. The Supreme Court
cites William Rawle’s writings as demonstrating that the “well-regulated”
phrase in the Second Amendment means “trained to arms.”190 Prior to and
during the creation of the US Constitution, several colonies included the
phrase “trained to arms” in their own iterations of the Second Amend-
ment.191 Even English law, the foundation of America’s Constitution, had
supporters for proper training. Stephen Halbrook discusses the history prior
to the Second Amendment in That Every Man Be Armed and cites James
Burgh, an influential Whig.192 Burgh wrote:
Nothing will make a nation so unconquerable as a militia, or
every man’s being trained to arms. . . . And if the generality of
housekeepers were only half-disciplined, a designing prince, or
ministry, would hardly dare to provoke the people by an open
attack on their liberties. . . . But without the people’s having some
knowledge of arms, I see not what is to secure them against slav-
ery . . . .193
As Halbrook notes, to the historical writers like Rawle, “[t]he militia was
not a government organization but a people with arms and with knowledge
of how to use them.”194
Considering the direct language of the Supreme Court in Heller and
the historical support for the Court’s assertion that “well-regulated” means
well-trained, the actual text and meaning of the Second Amendment
uniquely supports the CFETS Act. If, as the Court stated in Heller, the text
of the Second Amendment creates an “imposition of proper discipline and
training,”195 then the CFETS Act is not only constitutional but has the
unique privilege of furthering a denoted constitutional right. Since
permitless carry states allow citizens to carry firearms without any educa-
189. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 597 (2008).
190. Id.; WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
121–22 (1829).
191. STEPHEN P. HALBROOK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED: THE EVOLUTION OF A CONSTITU-
TIONAL RIGHT 83 (Univ. of N.M. Press rev. ed. 2013) (1984).
192. The Whigs were a political faction in England who “opposed royal absolutism . . . sup-
ported the rights of parliament, and wanted to limit royal power.” ROBERT LEACH, POLITICAL
IDEOLOGY IN BRITAIN 28 (3d ed. 2015).
193. RAWLE, supra note 190, at 55 (citing JAMES BURGH, POLITICAL DISQUISITIONS 399–401
(1774)).
194. HALBROOK, supra note 191, at 55.
195. D.C. v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 597 (2008).
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tion or training, the CFETS Act will bring those states into alignment with
the textual meaning of the Second Amendment: the right of citizens, trained
in firearms, to have firearms for self-defense. Because of this unique posi-
tion, the CFETS Act is constitutional and passes the constitutionality re-
quirement of the Dole test.
V. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST A FEDERALLY ESTABLISHED MINIMUM
EDUCATION AND TRAINING REQUIREMENT
Regardless of Congress’s constitutional ability to pass the CFETS Act,
there will almost certainly be opposition to the act’s passage. Opponents of
the CFETS Act may point to several policy arguments against requiring a
minimum education and training requirement. The primary arguments that
may be put forward are that the CFETS Act places a financial burden on
states to provide training, that the act places unnecessary restrictions on
citizens wanting to defend themselves, and that the act is a step toward
more firearm regulations. Each of these arguments is rebutted below, and,
on balance, the CFETS Act will be beneficial to the American public.
A. Placing the Cost of Training and Education on the States Does Not
Create an Unnecessary Financial Burden
The CFETS Act is structured so that active law enforcement officers
are tasked with leading the required training and education programs for
those who wish to carry a concealed weapon. Unlike the current situation,
where private institutions can hire private certified firearms instructors, the
act requires that all concealed carry training be done by active officers who
have completed the federally established instructor certification program.
Having active officers train the public not only ensures that qualified indi-
viduals are instructors but also bridges the gap between law enforcement
and citizens. Citizens will be exposed to officers in a relaxed, structured
environment, and officers will have the chance to teach people who wish to
carry concealed firearms how to do so legally and responsibly. This struc-
ture reduces the anxiety mentioned in Section II, when officers encounter
someone carrying a concealed firearm lawfully, and will help reduce inju-
ries and death. Likewise, citizens will hear just how important it is that they
act in prescribed manners when interacting with law enforcement while car-
rying firearms. There are benefits on both sides.
However, there are costs associated with training. Departments will
need staff to train citizens, which may require overtime, reallocation of
hours, or hiring. These options cost money, and the argument may be made
that placing the burden on already strained police departments will impact
law enforcement. However, this problem can be eliminated. First, under the
CFETS Act, participating states can apply for additional funding to offset
the financial burden of leading trainings. The grants can be distributed as
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the states see fit but will go exclusively toward firearm education and train-
ing costs. Second, just as citizens often pay CCW permit training and edu-
cation fees now, the states can set up their own fee payment structure. Since
the act will functionally remove private CCW permit training courses, the
fees citizens pay to those courses now can simply be paid to the state di-
rectly. The states and localities can also increase taxes or reallocate their
own budgets. It is important that law enforcement in participating states do
not feel a financial impact by passing the CFETS Act; if the incentive for
states to adopt the CFETS Act is a decrease in the state’s budget by with-
holding federal funds, then the outcome for those that do adopt the CFETS
Act cannot be increased financial strain from new training costs. What
could kill the CFETS Act is a situation in which law enforcement and states
are doomed if they do, doomed if they don’t. However, under the language
of the legislation and the individual state’s ability to levy fees for training,
law enforcement budgets should not be heavily impacted.196
B. The CFETS Act Does Not Put an Unnecessary Restriction on Those
Wanting to Protect Themselves
While the CFETS Act passes constitutional muster, opponents of the
CFETS Act may still view it as an unnecessary restriction on citizens’ abil-
ity to carry concealed weapons.197 Ten hours of education and training, ap-
plication times and fees, and fresh restrictions on concealed carry in
permitless carry states may all be viewed as unnecessary hoops to jump
through.198 Considering the NRA has supported the trend towards
permitless states,199 reimplementing training and education requirements in
those states may be seen as a barrier to citizens defending themselves. How-
ever, there are several issues with this strain of arguments. The CFETS Act
is not a barrier to self-defense but an act that promotes and enables safe,
competent self-defense.
Setting aside the importance of knowing when it is legal and ethical to
use a firearm in a DGU, for proper self-defense, citizens need to understand
how to actually operate their firearms. In constitutional carry states, citizens
can carry concealed firearms without ever having fired them. Some have
never been formally trained on the basics of marksmanship, much less high-
stress defensive encounters. Even in states with concealed carry classes, the
196. See infra Appendix A, Citizen’s Firearm Education and Training Safety Act, Sections C,
D (2019).
197. The NRA labels itself as “Freedom’s Safest Place” and has the following language on its
site: “In the face of gun-hating political elites, a dishonest media and radical billionaires who want
to fundamentally change America and restrict our Second Amendment freedoms, our only choice
is to fight.” NRA Speaks for Me, NRA, https://www.nraspeaksforme.com (last visited Mar. 1,
2020).
198. See infra Appendix A, Citizen’s Firearm Education and Training Safety Act, Section E
(2019).
199. Gstalter, supra note 4; Gruber-Miller, supra note 4.
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marksman training can be insufficient to train citizens.200 Inefficient fire-
arms training leads to firearm malfunctions, strayed shots, and poor re-
sponse times, all of which prevent citizens from successfully defending
themselves. The CFETS Act mitigates these dangers by properly training
all citizens who want to carry concealed firearms. Given that the NRA em-
phasizes the importance of training on its site,201 and has a history of pro-
moting and leading its own established training programs,202 there can be
little debate about the importance and difference proper firearm training can
have in effective self-defense. The CFETS Act removes one of the greatest
barriers to proper self-defense: incompetence.
In addition, the act affects only those who carry concealed weapons in
public. Firearm use and ownership in the home are unaffected, as is open
carry. Those who wish to defend themselves in their own homes, away
from the crowds and risk of endangering the public, are exempt from the
requirements of the act. The narrowness of the act unfortunately reduces its
effectiveness in curbing improper firearm use and care, but it does create a
balance between improving public safety and upholding an individual’s
rights in her home.
Finally, the CFETS Act is an optional regulation. Since the conditional
grant structure used in the CFETS Act is not coercive,203 each state can
determine whether it will opt in to the mandatory training and education
requirements. The law places training and education requirements on only
states that pass the necessary legislation to receive the grants; any state can
decide to forgo the grants and continue with the status quo. In either case,
the state legislatures and their constituents will determine whether the
CFETS Act impacts them or not. Those who believe the CFETS Act unnec-
essarily impacts their right to self-defense can voice their opinion to their
legislature before any regulations are adopted in their state.
C. Passing the Proposed Legislation Will Not Lead to Increased
Firearm Regulations
Because the CFETS Act imposes federal firearm restrictions, there
may be concern that it will open the gates for more federal level firearms
regulations, such as the creation of a national firearm registry.204 However,
the CFETS Act is predominantly a state-controlled program. While the min-
200. Tom McHale, 8 Reasons You Need Real Firearms Training, BERETTA BLOG (Mar. 7,
2019, 12:13 PM), http://blog.beretta.com/8-reasons-you-need-firearms-training.
201. See A Brief History of the NRA, NRA, https://home.nra.org/about-the-nra (last visited
Mar. 1, 2020).
202. Id.; NRA Firearm Training, NRA, https://firearmtraining.nra.org (last visited Mar. 1,
2020).
203. See supra Section III, Part (B)(4).
204. Gun Registration ⏐ Gun Licensing, NRA-ILA (Aug. 8, 2016), https://www.nraila.org/
get-the-facts/registration-licensing. At the time of this essay, current presidential candidate Cory
Booker has announced his plans for a national gun registry. Emily Larsen, Cory Booker Plans
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imum requirements for training and education are established by the federal
government, states can choose to opt in or out of the regulations. Unlike
many of the federal firearms restrictions that concern Second Amendment
advocates, the CFETS Act is not a widespread restriction or outright re-
quirement; there is flexibility in the states. Because the implementation and
execution of the restriction is predominantly state-controlled instead of fed-
erally controlled, the act is unique among federal firearms laws.
If there is one federal law that might pass in response to the CFETS
Act, it is national reciprocity. National reciprocity is a program where each
state recognizes and enforces the concealed carry laws of every other
state.205 For example, a concealed carry permit issued in Minnesota will be
recognized and honored in all other forty-nine states. Currently, a system of
state-run reciprocity exists in the United States, with the average state rec-
ognizing permits from more than thirty other states.206 However, it is up to
the discretion of the states to determine to whom they will grant reciprocity.
No national reciprocity program exists now, but there is pending legislation
proposing a national reciprocity system, supported by the NRA and other
firearm advocates.207 However, the major issue with the current national
reciprocity proposal is that it creates a system where states with high train-
ing requirements have to recognize concealed carry permits from states
with functionally no training requirements.208 The bill diminishes education
and training requirements for concealed carry by forcing states with strong
training and education to honor permits from states with weak training and
education. As Hannah Shearer points out, under H.R. 38, states with strong
laws, like California, would be forced to allow residents of permitless carry
states to carry their concealed guns in California with no training require-
ments or background checks. They would also be required to recognize all
valid concealed carry permits issued by another state, including those that
do little or nothing to restrict the carrying of concealed firearms by un-
trained people or people who cannot pass a background check. In some
cases, this means states would have to recognize permits issued to their own
residents by another state that offers permits to nonresidents.209
The CFETS Act solves this issue. By creating a system where every
state has the same training and education requirements, the concern over
National Gun Registry, WASH. EXAMINER (May 6, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/
news/cory-booker-plans-national-gun-registry.
205. Hannah E. Shearer, Jeopardizing “Their Communities, Their Safety, and Their Lives”:
Forced Concealed Carry Reciprocity’s Threat to Federalism, 45 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 429
(2018).
206. Brandon Mosely, Mike Rogers Cosponsors Concealed Carry Reciprocity Act, ALA. PO-
LITICAL REPORTER (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.alreporter.com/2019/01/30/mike-rogers-cospon
sors-concealed-carry-reciprocity-act.
207. Shearer, supra note 205, at 431–33; H.R. 38, 116th Cong. (2019).
208. Shearer, supra note 205, at 431–33.
209. Id.
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more restrictive and less restrictive training requirements disappears. States
that opt in to the CFETS Act regulations will be more likely to grant reci-
procity to fellow CFETS Act–compliant states, and if all fifty states opt in,
it will remove a major barrier from national reciprocity legislation. This
should act as a strong incentive for Second Amendment proponents to back
the CFETS Act, as the only legislation it lays the foundation for is legisla-
tion that they want passed.
VI. CONCLUSION
As the number of citizens carrying concealed firearms increases, the
importance of proper firearm training and education also increases. Proper
training and education ensure that citizens know how to handle and store
their firearms. They also ensure that citizens properly use their firearms for
self-defense and teaches citizens how to respond during and after a self-
defense shooting. They can also reduce the number of incidents between
citizens who are legally carrying firearms and law enforcement. A growing
number of states do not require any education or training for their citizens
to carry concealed weapons. Even in states that do require training and edu-
cation, the requirements are often vague, and the CCW course experience is
not uniform.
To combat these issues, Congress should pass the CFETS Act. Be-
cause the act uses conditional grant spending, and because the act does not
violate the Second Amendment, it is a constitutional exercise of congres-
sional power. Furthermore, the act’s scope and benefits far outweigh any
possible inconveniences to citizens. By incentivizing states to adopt a uni-
form minimum training and education requirement, the CFETS Act will
improve public safety and ensure that citizens who carry concealed firearms
are smarter, safer, and better prepared for what happens in a self-defense
shooting.
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APPENDIX A: PROPOSED LEGISLATION
Citizen’s Firearm Education and Training Safety Act
(a) Withholding of funds for noncompliance.—The Secretary shall
withhold one and one-half (1.5) percent of the amount of funding required
to be apportioned to or requested from any State, granted from the Office of
Justice Programs, on the first day of each fiscal year after the second fiscal
year beginning after September 30, 2020, in which the carrying of a con-
cealed firearm without completing the education and training requirements
of section (e) is lawful.
(b) Effects of withholding of funds.—No funds withheld under this
section from apportionment to any State after September 30, 2023, shall be
available for apportionment to that State.
(c) States that pass legislation implementing the training and educa-
tion standards from section (e) may apply for additional grant funding to
reduce the financial cost of hosting training programs. The funds granted
may be disbursed as the states see fit, but only for the purposes of alleviat-
ing the costs and reasonably related costs of running the concealed carry
training and education programs.
(d) States that pass legislation implementing the training and educa-
tion standards from section (e) may set up their own fee system for citizens
who wish to carry concealed firearms. The fees currently paid to private
organizations for CCW permit courses or similar certifications can instead
be paid to law enforcement agencies who train and educate citizens pursu-
ant to this Act.
(e) Minimum Education and Training Requirements.—States that
wish to receive the funding otherwise withheld in section (a) must require
that citizens who wish to carry concealed firearms complete the following
minimum education and training requirements:
(1) Complete a minimum ten-hour course led by a Certified LEO Fire-
arm Instructor, comprised of the following:
(A) Five hours of firearm safety, legal, and emergency response edu-
cation. At minimum, the education must cover the following topics:
(i) The proper method of storing, handling, and caring for the citizen’s
concealed carry firearm;
(ii) The State’s legal allowances for use of deadly force, including
self-defense, and the restrictions on the use of deadly force;
(iii) State and Federal unlawful acts with a firearm under relevant
state law and 18 U.S.C. § 922 respectively;
(iv) The best practices for interacting with law enforcement when car-
rying a concealed firearm;
(v) The best practices for avoiding interactions that require the use of
a concealed firearm;
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(vi) The best practices for emergency response and post-engagement
conduct; and
(vii) The mental, legal, physical, and emotional outcome of engaging
in a defensive gun use.
(B) Participants must pass an examination of their legal and ethical
requirements to complete the training.
(C) Five hours of firearm training. The training must cover the follow-
ing topics:
(i) Instruction on firearm safety at the range and at home;
(ii) Instruction in fundamentals of pistol use;
(iii) Instruction in the fundamentals of pistol cleaning, care, and
maintenance;
(iv) Successful completion of a standard shooting qualification exami-
nation, as determined by best practices, which must include the following
scenarios:
high-stress encounters and shooting




(1) Generally.—Each individual who completes the education and
training program shall be issued a certificate of completion by his or her
resident state.
(A) Permit-Requiring States.—The certificate may be given to a CCW
Issuer as proof of completion of the training and education requirement
upon application for a State’s CCW Permit or similar permit to carry a
concealed weapon.
(B) Permitless States.—The certificate may be carried in states that do
not require concealed carry permits. Law enforcement may not ask to see
the training certificate unless they have probable cause to believe the indi-
vidual carrying a firearm has not completed the mandatory training
program.
(2) Renewal.—The training and education requirement must be com-
pleted by an individual wishing to carry a concealed firearm the lesser of
either every five years or the expiration term of the citizen’s oldest con-
cealed carry permit still valid.
(A) If the individual lives in a permitless state and is not required to
have a concealed carry permit, he or she must retake and pass the training
and education requirements in that state every five years.
(B) If the individual lives in a permit-issuing state with a renewal pe-
riod for his or her concealed carry permits of less than five years, he or she
must retake and pass the training and education at each renewal period.
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(C) If the individual has concealed carry permits in more than one
state, the individual must retake and pass the training and education require-
ments in the lesser of every five years or the permit renewal term for the
first state in which the individual received his or her concealed carry permit.
(g) Definitions.—
(1) “Firearm” defined.—As used in this section, the term “firearm”
means—
(A) Firearm as defined in 18 U.S.C. § 926(e)(1).
(2) “Best Practices” defined.—As used in this section, “best practices”
means—
(A) The practices, training, or standards set by an appointed commit-
tee comprising International Law Enforcement Educators and Trainers As-
sociation (ILEETA) members, other law enforcement, and industry experts
on self-defense and firearm handling.
(i) The committee will be jointly appointed by the Committee Chair-
men. The Committee Chairs will consist of the Executive Director of
ILEETA, or his or her designee, and the Acting Deputy Director of the
Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, or his or her desig-
nee. The committee will consist of the two Chairs and seven other appoin-
tees for a total of nine members.
(3) Certified LEO Firearm Instructor defined.—As used in this sec-
tion, the term “Certified LEO Firearm Instructor means—
(A) An active Law Enforcement Officer (LEO) who has completed
the federally-established instructor program, created using best practices.
(4) Concealed Carry Permit, or CCW, defined.—As used in this sec-
tion, the interchangeable terms Concealed Carry Permit or CCW mean—
(A) A state-issued license to lawfully carry a concealed firearm.
